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PROPERTY
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
PUBLIC THINGS
The legal status of artificial navigable waterways has not
been sufficiently explored in Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrine. The central issue is whether an artificial navigation canal
is necessarily a public thing, either in the sense that it is a part
of the public domain or in the sense that it is burdened with a
servitude of public use. It would seem that "a canal built entirely on private property for private purposes is a private thing,
for the same reasons that a road built on private property for
private purposes is a private thing."' Conversely, a navigation
canal constructed by public authorities on a right of way servitude or on public land is certainly a thing of the public domain. Determination of the ownership of the canal, however,
does not resolve the issue of public use. The two questions are
distinct and distinguishable.
In Discon v. Saray, Inc.,2 a tract of land was traversed
by
two artificial waterways, found by the court to be navigable in
fact. The landowner intended to fill one of the waterways in
order to develop his land commercially, and to improve the remaining waterway. Plaintiffs, owners of property upstream,
sought an injunction, contending that their access to Lake Pontchartrain was threatened. The Louisiana supreme court held
that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief by application
of article 97 of the Criminal Code. The court declared that the
canal that defendant intended to fill was a dedicated right of
way rather than a conventional servitude; in the alternative,
even if plaintiffs were merely entitled to a servitude of passage,
defendant was not entitled to relocate the right of way by application of article 777 of the Civil Code, because the proposed
new location was greatly inconvenient for the owners of the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CMV1L
LAW PROPERTY § 31.5 (Supp. 1972); cf.
D'Albora v. Garcia, 144 So.2d 911, 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962): "[Plrivate
ownership is not inconsistent with the navigability of the body or stream."
Harvey v. Potter, 19 La. Ann. 264 (1867).
2. 265 So.2d 765 (La. 1972).
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dominant estates. Justice Barham concurred in the result, and
Justice Summers filed a vigorous dissent.
According to stipulations and documentary evidence, the
canals were defendant's private property. The fact that they
contained navigable water within their banks was not sufficient
to vest title in the state or to qualify them as things of the public
domain. Question arises, however, whether the canals were
subject to public use. Public use, likened to a servitude, may
arise either by directly applicable provisions of law, as in the
case of the use of the banks of navigable rivers, or by dedication, as in the case of roads and streets. Prescription may be
relevant only under conditions of article 765 of the Civil Code;
in all other contexts, public use is regarded as a discontinuous
servitude that may not be established by prescription.
The majority opinion necessarily rests on the assumption
that the canal in question was burdened with a servitude of
public use. Indeed, it would be inconceivable to apply article
97 of the Criminal Code to a strictly private waterway.3 The
majority proceeded on the idea that this article was applicable
because the canal was navigable, and, therefore, was burdened
with a servitude of public use; in the alternative, that the canal
was burdened with a servitude of public use by virtue of dedication. No one, however, should be prepared to accept the proposition that all navigable waterways in Louisiana are subject to
public use merely by virtue of the fact they are navigable. 4 A
privately owned canal, though navigable in fact, may not be
subject to public use, for the same reasons that a private road,
though used by commercial traffic, may not be subject to public
use. Thus, the disposition of the case would be correct only if
the canal in question had been dedicated to public use.
3. See dissenting opinion in Discon v. Saray, Inc., 265 So.2d 765, 775 (La.
1972): "Thus a public navigable waterway is intended to be within the
scope of the article, not a private canal, built by private enterprise on private property ....
It is manifestly absurd to say that a person cannot
obstruct a private canal on his private property even if it Is navigable....

Article 97 will have no bearing upon the rights of the parties In the private
canal. Only when the canal is a highway of commerce and a public way
does Article 97 come to bear." (Summers, J.)
4. See Yiannopoulos, The Public Use of the Banks of Navigable Rivers
in Louisiana, 31 LA. L. REv. 563, 567 (1971); Dlscon v. Saray, Inc., 265 So.2d
765. 775 (La. 1972): "Such a waterway is not a public waterway within the
intendment of Article 97, despite the fact that it is clearly navigable and
is extensively used by those entitled to the right." (dissenting opinion of
Summers, J.). Harvey v. Potter, 19 La. Ann. 264 (1867).
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According to Louisiana jurisprudence, the filing of the plat
of a subdivision in substantial compliance with the applicable
legislation results in formal dedication of roads and streets. The
majority opinion in the case under consideration may be taken
to indicate that the notion of formal dedication extends to navigable canals figuring in a recorded subdivision plat. This may
be a plausible idea, but, on account of its novelty, it should not
be established by way of dicta. Be that as it may, formal dedication vests in the public the ownership of roads and streets. 5
The question whether a subdivider may merely dedicate a servitude of passage over the roads and streets of a subdivision has
not been raised in reported cases. Perhaps a subdivider should
have this right, although recent decisions seem to indicate that
the mere appearance of a road in the recorded subdivision plat
results in formal dedication and in vesting of the ownership of
the road in the public." In the case under consideration, however, the court apparently assumed that a subdivider may retain
the ownership of dedicated roadways, including navigable canals.
The latent conflict may have to be clarified in the future.
The court declared that the recordation of the plat along
with restrictions and individual titles resulted in the dedication
of a right of way, in spite of express provisions in the recorded
instruments that were designed to exclude any form of dedication. This may be both a strained interpretation of the instruments in question and an implausible result. It would seem that
subdividers should have the right to exclude dedication and the
vesting of either ownership or servitude in the public. Indeed,
if a subdivider is free to retain the ownership of a roadway, he
should be also free to retain unencumbered ownership. The
court refrained from deciding whether the dedication was "a
public dedication or . . .merely a dedication for the benefit of

the property owners of the subdivision."7 It would seem that
the only dedication known to Louisiana law is dedication to
public use and that a dedication for the benefit of certain landowners is merely a conventional servitude.
5. See Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183
So. 229 (1938); Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So.2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1969); Village of Folsom v. Alford, 204 So.2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967);
Kemp v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934).
6. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So.2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969);
Comment, 30 LA. L. Rsv. 583 (1970); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Property, 31 LA. L. REv. 196, 201 (1971).
7. Discon v. Saray, Inc., 265 So.2d 765, 770 (La. 1972).
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Leaving aside issues of dedication that were not directly
raised, the most plausible ground for decision seems to be that
defendant failed to make a case for application of article 777 of
the Civil Code. Defendant conceded that the land was burdened
with a conventional servitude of passage in favor of plaintiff's
estates. This servitude could be relocated on a showing that the
original location became "more burdensome" for the owner of
the servient estate and that the proposed new location was
"equally convenient" for the owners of the dominant estates.
According to the majority, defendant did not offer an equally
convenient location; according to the dissent, defendant satisfied
the requirement of article 777 and was entitled to have the servitude relocated. Thus, in the last analysis, the controversy was
resolved in the light of factual considerations. For this reason,
the majority opinion should have little impact on the development of the Louisiana law of artificial waterways, dedication,
and predial servitudes.
NATURAL, LEGAL, AND

CONVENTIONAL

SERVITUDES

In Louisiana and in France, servitudes may be natural, arising from the natural situation of estates; legal, imposed by law;
and conventional, arising from destination of the owner, acquisitive prescription, or juridical act.8
Natural Servitudes
According to article 660 of the Civil Code, the estate situated below is bound to "receive the waters which run naturally
from the estate situated above, provided the industry of man
has not been used to create that servitude. The proprietor below
is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to make any other work,
to prevent this running of the water."9 Important questions
concerning the meaning of these provisions and the scope of the
natural servitude of drain were raised in Poole v. Guste'0 where
plaintiff brought suit for injunctive relief, mandatory and prohibitory, and for damages resulting from the obstruction by
8. see LA. Civ. CoDE art. 659; cf. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 640-48; Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes: General Principles; Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. LAw REv. 1, 43 (1968).
9. LA. Cv. CODE art. 660; cf. FRENCH Cry. CODE art. 640.
10. 246 So.2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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defendant of a servitude of drain. Plaintiff claimed that he was
entitled to a natural servitude of drain under article 660; in the
alternative, plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to the same
servitude by 'acquisitive prescription under articles 709 and 765
of the Civil Code. The court of appeal found that defendant's
estate was situated below, and that plaintiff's estate was therefore entitled to a natural servitude of drain. The court refrained
from reaching a decision as to the existence of a conventional
servitude of drain, but the tenor of the opinion suggested that
such a servitude existed. The Louisiana supreme court granted
12
certiorari" and affirmed.
Justice Tate, writing for the majority, accepted the lower
court's findings of facts and proceeded to a masterful analysis
of pertinent questions of law. His opinion deserves attention
because it clarifies the application of certain provisions of the
Civil Code and indicates areas that will require clarification in
the future. The court expressly refrained from deciding the following matters:
1. Whether the existence of a conventional servitude precludes the acquisition by prescription of a different or more extensive continuous and apparent servitude. The court correctly
noted, however, that there is French authority for an affirmative
answer and that articles 797 and 800 of the Louisiana Civil Code
lead to the same conclusion.
2. Whether a continuous and apparent servitude may be
acquired merely by ten years simple unopposed use under
article 765 or whether thirty years use is required for acquisitive
prescription without title under article 3504. It was in part the
desire of the court to clarify this quesiton that promped the
grant of certiorari. This question, however, was not raised under
the facts and pleadings, and the court wisely avoided determination by way of dicta.
3. Whether the modification of a natural servitude of drain
by works changes its nature and converts it into a conventional
servitude by prescription. It would seem that the answer to this
question depends on facts and circumstances, and that quantitative changes may indeed result in qualitative differentiation.
11. 258 La. 760, 247 So.2d 861 (1971).
12. 261 La. 1110, 262 So.2d 339 (1972).
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Material modifications may thus result in the acquisition of a
conventional servitude; insubstantial modifications may be merely modes of use of a natural servitude.
The court did decide that article 660 of the Civil Code does
not contemplate an estate that is overall higher to another. The
natural servitude of drain thus follows individual patterns along
particular points of the boundary; namely, it attaches to points
where one estate is upper to the other. This is the only plausible
interpretation of article 660 in the light of its purpose. Unfortunately, little guidance may be gained in this field from contemporary French doctrine and jurisprudence, for the simple
reason that the corresponding article of the French Civil Code
has been modified by substantial water legislation.'8 Such legislation is certainly needed in Louisiana, but until it is enacted
courts will have to resort to the Civil Code, reason, and common sense. French commentators of past generations did not
take care to define the terms "upper estate" and "lower estate."
This may be so because in France most estates are small, the
terrain is ordinarily uneven, and the water flows in an easily
ascertainable single direction. In Louisiana's flatlands, however,
relative overall elevation of two estates is not an easy matter
to determine even by scientific methods, and the most reliable
guide remains the flow of the waters. 14 The existence of large
estates and the possibility of reciprocal flows depending on
slightest differences of elevation, make it apparent that overall
height is and ought to be immaterial. It is submitted that the
pertinent articles of the Civil Code must be applied in accordance
with common sense and reason, without resorting to involved
scientific calculations. Denial of a natural servitude at a particular point for the reason that overall elevation is lacking
would certainly upset natural flows and would render cultivation and irrigation uneconomic in many cases. The purpose of
the natural servitude of drain is to maintain the status quo as
it exists in nature, 15 and this is accomplished by recognizing the
13. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPrRT, TRArr PRATIQUE DM DROIT CIVIL mRANgAIS 502
(2d ed. 1952).
14. See, e.g., Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877, 98 So. 403 (1923); Brown
v. Blankenship, 28 So.2d 496 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
15. See XI DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DES SERVITUDES 25 (1876): "[Tlhe legislator
has intervened in the private interest of the owners and In the general in-

terest of society, not to create a servitude but to give effect to the natural
situation of the places, so that each is bound to conform with It and to

maintain It."
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existence of a natural servitude of drain in individual points.
The court also decided that servitudes may be enforced in
Louisiana by mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, without
regard to historical limitations developed by the chancery court.
Thus, to the extent that property rights are protected by real
actions, the "clean hands" limitation is without application.
Further, in the light of Louisiana's "different civilian procedural
background," an injunction lies even if damages are an adequate
remedy, because "injunction has historically been recognized as
a remedy available to protect possession of property ... including ... the continued use of a servitude of drain over another's
land.""' Balancing of the equities is "'inappropriate"'" in cases
in which substantial damage has been caused and there has been
substantial interference with the use of property.
The court rejected defendant's propositions that the owner
of the dominant estate may not claim relief if he can achieve
drainage by means of works on his own land, and that the owner
of the servient estate may protect his works from tidal flow by
means of works that cause damage to his neighbor. The first
proposition is, of course, contrary to well-settled jurisprudence.18
The second proposition deserves discussion. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Summers suggested that article 660 should not apply
to marshlands overflowed by tides, and that the owner of such
lands should have the right to protect his property by means
of dikes, even if the works cause the waters to back up. Early
French commentators elaborating on article 640 of the French
Civil Code, corresponding with article 660 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, developed the idea that the prohibition of works
does not apply to rivers and streams. Thus, a landowner may
construct dams on his property, although these dams may cause
rain water to back up and to inundate neighboring property. 19
By analogy, it may be said that article 660 should not apply to
lands threatened by tidal overflow and that dikes might be
erected that cause rain waters to back up into the dominant
16. Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 1110, 1126-27, 262 So.2d 339, 345 (1972). See
also Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877, 98 So. 403 (1923).
17. 261 La. at 1126-27, 262 So.2d at 345.
18. See Nicholson v. Holloway Planting Co., 255 La. 1, 229 So.2d 679
(1969); Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877, 98 So. 403 (1923); Brown v. Blankenship, 28 So.2d 496 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
19. See XI DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DES SERVITUDES 34 (1876); cf. Mallhot v.
Pugh, 30 La. Ann, 1359 (1878).
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estate. This analogy, however, would not be applicable to all
marshlands. According to Demolombe, "the estates adjacent to
a marsh are bound to receive the waters that overflow as a result
of rain; and it is well-understood that the owners of inferior
estates or neighbors cannot free themselves of this natural servitude by means of works which cause the waters to back up into
superior estates or to estates of the same elevation."2 In case
of Code revision or enactment of comprehensive water legislation, attention should be focused on considerations of utility and
on the most economic methods for assuring drainage and agricultural exploitation of marshlands.
Legal Servitudes
Articles 667-69 of the Civil Code establish certain limitations on the content of the right of ownership which have been
qualified by the redactors as "servitudes" imposed by law. 21'
Article 667 declares that although an owner may do with his
estate whatever he pleases, "he cannot make any work on it,
which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his
own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him." The
following article 668 declares that an owner may nevertheless
do "on his ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should
occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor." Article 669, the
third in the series, declares that if works or operations cause
inconveniences by the diffusion of smoke or odors, "and there
be no servitude established by which they are regulated, their
sufferance must be determined by the rules of the police, or
the customs of the place."
Thus, article 667 prohibits works which cause damage or
deprive neighbors of the enjoyment of their property; article
668 allows works which merely cause "some inconvenience";
and article 669 indicates that, in the absence of a conventional
servitude, inconveniences resulting from the diffusion of smoke
or odors22 may be tolerated or suppressed, depending on police
regulations or local custom. Admittedly, lines of demarcation
20. XI DEMOLOMBE, TRAITA DES SERVITUDES 33

(1876).

21. See LA. Cv. CoDE art 664; Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes: General

Principles; Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 44 (1968).
22. The reference to smoke or odors in article 669 is merely illustrative.
See Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 155, 245 So.2d 385, 391 (1971)
(concurring opinion of Barham, J.).
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are not clearly drawn among works that cause damage or deprive a neighbor of the enjoyment of his property and inconveniences that fall short of that test and, therefore, must be
tolerated. Further, no clear line of demarcation is drawn between inconveniences that must be tolerated under article 668
and inconveniences that may or may not be tolerated under
article 669. Perhaps, the redactors of the code wanted to establish the following principles. No one may use his property so
as to cause damage to another or to interfere substantially with
the enjoyment of another's property (article 667). Landowners
must necessarily be exposed to some inconveniences arising
from the normal exercise of the right of ownership by a neighbor (article 668). But excessive inconvenience, such as those
caused by the diffusion of industrial smoke, odors, or noise, need
not be tolerated in the absence of a conventional servitude;
whether an inconvenience is excessive or not is to be determined
in the light of police regulations and local customs (article 669).
Be that as it may, the interpretation and application of these
articles tends to become a cause c~lbre in Louisiana.
Articles 667-69 have been applied by Louisiana courts together with the common law of nuisance to grant relief in cases
in which use of property causes damage or excessive inconvenience to neighbors. 25 It was, perhaps, natural for Louisiana
courts in the past to seek guidance in common law precedents.
French doctrine and jurisprudence could furnish little guidance
in this field, because the French Civil Code does not contain
corresponding articles.24 The common law of nuisance, on the
other hand, was supposed to reflect applications of the sic utere
doctrine, the same doctrine that articles 667-69 embody. In recent years, however, critical analysis has demonstrated that in
spite of similarities of underlying doctrine, the structure and
function of the law of nuisance is substantially different from
23. See Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So.2d 385, 389 (1971).
24. See Froelicher v. Southern Marine Works, 118 La. 1077, 1086, 43 So.
882, 885 (1907): "Our researchers in French jurisprudence have not enabled
us to find a pertinent decision. We infer that there are not many decisions
in France upon the subject, for the reason that that particular matter is left
in great part to municipal regulation, and not to private suits for damages."
See also Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206
(1919). It should be noted, however, that modern French jurisprudence has
developed rules corresponding to those established by LA. Crv. CODs arts.
667-69.

See 3 PLANIOL ST RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DU DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 450-67
AUBRY ET RAu, DROrT CIVIL FRANQAs 282 (7th ed. 1961).

(2d ed. 1952); 2
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the structure and function of legal servitudes. Indeed, the law
of nuisance is a branch of the common law of torts whereas
25
the legal servitudes are institutions of the civil law of property.
Accordingly, the modern trend in Louisiana jurisprudence calls
for direct application of the provisions of the Civil Code and
for use of common law precedents selectively as illustrations
of acceptable practical solutions. 26 The Louisiana supreme court
has repeatedly declared that in this field of property law "while
... common-law authorities... may be persuasive, they are not
decisive of the issue in view of our codal articles and jurisprudence."-' r It is submitted that continued reliance on the common
law of nuisance in the framework of civil law property institutions is unnecessary and confusing. Louisiana courts are in
a position to develop the practical implications of articles 667-69
in the light of contemporary exigencies, relying on civilian
methodology and on the accumulated gloss of Louisiana jurisprudence.
In Hilliard v. Shuif,28 a landowner sued the lessee 29 of adjoining property, owner and operator of a service station, to
compel him to remove or place underground certain fuel tanks.
25. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Property,31 LA. L. Rsv. 196, 223 (1971). Moreover, the notion of nuisance remains undefined and undefinable in common law jurisdictions.
See W. PRossER, TORTS § 87, at 592 (3d ed. 1964): "There is perhaps no more
impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word
'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach
baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact
or comprehensive definition. Few terms have afforded so excellent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catchword as
a substitute for any analysis of a problem . .. ."
26. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 390, 256 So.2d 127, 129 (1971) ("These
code articles [667-691 control the disposition of the case."); Borenstein v.
Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So.2d 800, 803 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971) ("The
obligations of proprietors toward one another are prescribed by [Civil Code]
arts. 666-669."); Rayborn v. Smiley, 253 So.2d 664, 665 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971) ("The applicable law is found in Articles 666-669 of the Civil Code.").
27. Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes, Inc., 222 La. 57, 89, 62 So.2d
100, 111 (1952); of. Barrow v. Gaillardanne, 122 La. 558, 571, 47 So. 891,
896 (1908): "The common law authorities relied on by the defendants have
no application to the present case." See also Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart.
(N.S.) 408 (La. 1827).
28. 260 La. 384, 256 So.2d 127 (1971).
29. Question has arisen whether article 667-69 of the Civil Code impose
obligations on lessees or only on owners. See Borenstein v. Joseph Fein
Caterers, Inc., 255 So.2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Burke v. Besthoff
Realty Co., 196 So.2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). In Hilliard v. Shuff, 260
La. 384, 256 So.2d 127 (1971), the Louisiana supreme court proceeded on the
assumption that articles 667-69 impose obligations on lessees as well as on
owners.
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The tanks were located above-ground within five feet of plaintiff's property; they were designed for the storage of crude oil,
but were used by defendant for the storage of much more volatile gasoline and diesel fuels. As a result of such use, fumes
that could be ignited by random sparks escaped from the tanks
and created a zone of danger extending well into plaintiff's
property. Plaintiff contended that the maintenance of the tanks
deprived him of the use of 45 feet of his property and posed a
threat to his residence in violation of articles 667-69.
Justice Sanders, writing for the majority of the court, agreed
that "[t]hese code articles control the disposition of the case"30
and proceeded to an interpretation that deserves attention. According to the court,
"[t]he storage of basic fuels, a lawful activity, does not,
without more, violate these articles. . . . When, however,
the storage of fuel creates a substantial hazard to the adjoining property, the use of the property runs counter to
the code articles. In determining whether the storage creates
a substantial hazard to the adjoining property, the court
must consider such factors as location, structure of the
storage tanks, quantity of fuel stored, operational procedures, as well as the surrounding circumstances." 31
In the light of these considerations and pertinent evidence,
the court concluded that articles 667-69 had been violated by
defendant's use of crude oil tanks for the storage of gasoline
and diesel fuel within a few feet of plaintiff's property. Nevertheless, the court was not prepared to grant the relief that plaintiff requested. According to the majority, the violation of the
code articles relating to the use of property "requires no automatic injunction to remove the tanks .... Injunction is an equitable remedy and should be carefully designed to achieve the
essential correction at the least possible cost and inconvenience
to the defendant." 2 Since the record failed to reflect whether
some correction short of removal or underground placement
was feasible, the case was remanded to the trial court for reception of further evidence relative to methods of correction.
Justice Barham dissented. He disagreed both with the dis30. Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 390, 256 So.2d 127, 129 (1971).
31. Id.
32. 1d.
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position of the case and with the reasoning of the majority opinion. According to Justice Barham, articles 667 and 669 contemplate distinct and distinguishable situations. Article 667 establishes a servitude; hence, in case the servitude is interfered with,
the owner of the servitude is entitled to total relief in the form
of a permanent injunction: "The only requirement is an objective finding of probability that the owner of the dominant estate
may at some time be deprived of enjoyment of his property or
suffer damage because of the work made upon the servient
estate."33 Article 669, on the other hand, does not establish a
servitude; it merely affords relief "after proof of subjective inconvenience." Since the evidence did not establish a finding
that the plaintiff had in fact been disturbed in any manner in
the enjoyment of his estate or has even been inconvenienced,
he was not entitled to any relief under article 669. He was,
nevertheless, entitled "to immediate and full abatement of the
4
encroachment upon his legal servitude under article 667."Justice Barham had sought to develop a rational scheme for
interpretation and application of articles 667-69 in combination
with article 2315. This scheme emerges in its entirety only from
the study of a series of opinions rendered in recent years, because judges do not have the opportunity to write decisions in
the form of a leading article; the development of the doctrine
from the bench is gradual and interstitial. The outlines of Justice Barham's scheme are as follows. Article 2315 establishes a
rule of delictual responsibility; it grants recovery for damage
occasioned through fault. The notion of fault, however, does
not include merely negligence and intentional misconduct; it
also includes responsibility for ultra-hazardous activities.8 5
Article 667, establishing a predial servitude, contains a rule of
property law. This article grants recovery to the owner of the
dominant estate for damage caused to his property by means
of "works" 86 on neighboring property without regard to fault.
It also authorizes injunctions for the complete abatement of
works that interfere with the servitude.87 The principle of lia33. Id. at 396, 256 So.2d at 131.
34. Id. at 398, 256 So.2d at 132.
35. See Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133
(1971).
36. See

Reymond v.

State, Dep't of Highways,

255 La. 125, 231 So.2d

375 (1970).
37. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 392, 256 So.2d 127, 130 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
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bility without fault that this article establishes is essential for
an expansive interpretation and application of article 2315. Indeed, it is by an analogy from article 667 that article 2315 is
applicable to ultra-hazardous activities. Article 669 establishes
an obligation of vicinage rather than a servitude; accordingly,
it grants relief to any person seriously inconvenienced in the
enjoyment of property. Action may thus be brought for damages
and injunction by anyone against anyone, without the limitations inherent in article 667. Injunctive relief, however, is authorized only to the extent that works or activities cause serious
inconveniences.88 This scheme has the advantages of simplicity
and rigorous logical consistency. It is based on civilian methodology and renders superfluous any reference to the common law
of nuisance. If Louisiana courts had the opportunity for a fresh
start, the merits of this scheme ought to be seriously considered.
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, however, ought to be interpreted in the light of its historical sources, and one has to cope
with the gloss of jurisprudence that has grown around its provisions. Article 667 contemplates damage caused by both acts
and works;8 9 and the inconveniences to which article 669 refers
may derive from both acts and works.4° And if article 667 establishes a servitude, it would seem that so does article 669, albeit
by virtue of police regulations and local customs rather than by
legislation.
If Justice Barham's premise were granted, namely, that
article 667 establishes a veritable predial servitude, it ought to
follow that any interference with that servitude ought to be
abated by permanent injunction. According to contemporary
doctrine, however, article 667 establishes merely a limitation on
the content of the right of ownership, as does article 669. 41 This
limitation is an expression of an obligation of vicinage and is
likened to a servitude. According to Louisiana jurisprudence
constante, the violation of articles 667-69 does not necessarily
give rise to an absolute injunction for the suppression of works
or activities on neighboring estates. As a rule, it is only unlaw38. See Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 155, 245 So.2d 385, 391
(1971) (concurring opinion).

39. See Chaney v. Travelers Insurance Co., 259 La. 1, 249 So.2d 181 (1971).
40. See LA. CiV. COne art. 669: "If the works or materials from any manufactory or other operation ......
(Emphasis added.)

41. See Yiannopoulos, Predial Servtiudes: General Principles;Louisiana
and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. Rzv. 1, 44 (1968).
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ful works or activities that may be totally abated.2 A lawful
business may not be totally abated, even if it causes damage or
annoyance to neighbors.4 Neighbors may be entitled to recover
damages for the prejudice they have suffered, and may obtain
injunctions designed to minimize inconveniences and to correct
the manner in which the business is conducted. 44 In the case under
consideration, the placement of above-ground fuel storage tanks
near plaintiff's property was a legitimate exercise of a right in
the pursuit of a lawful business. The mere presence of the storage tanks did not violate articles 667-69 of the Civil Code;45 it
was the manner in which the tanks were used that created the
zone of danger. Accordingly, an injunction would be the appropriate remedy for the correction of the improper use of the tanks.
This was accomplished by the majority decision.
Justice Barham's view that an injunction for the removal
of the storage tanks ought to be granted might find support,
apart from articles 667-69, in the articles of the Civil Code dealing with new works46 and in articles 3601 and 3663 of the Louisi42. See, e.g., cases involving abatement of business conducted in violation of ordinances: State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752,
123 So. 314 (1929); State v. Judge, 29 La. Ann. 870 (1877); City of New Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (1859); Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann.
227 (1855). In two cases, however, the operation of a business establishment
was enjoined, even in the absence of any ordinance. See Roche v. Roumain, 51 So.2d 666 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Talbot v. Stiles, 189 So. 469
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
43. See, e.g., Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 153, 245 So.2d 385 (1971);
McGee v. Yazoo, & M.V.R. Co., 206 La. 121, 19 So.2d 21 (1944); Di Carlo v.
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933); Labasse v.
Platt, 121 La. 601, 46 So. 665 (1908); Froelicher v. Oswald Ironworks, 111
La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Koehl v. Schoenhausen, 47 La. Ann. 1316 (1895);
Scott v. LeCompte, 260 So.2d 345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Rayborn v. Smiley,
253 So.2d 664 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
44. See Beauvais v. D.C. Hall Transport, 49 So.2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1950) (injunction restraining the operation of a freight terminal in such a
manner as to cause excessive inconvenience to neighbors); Galouye v. A.R.
Blossman, Inc., 32 So.2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) (damages awarded to
plaintiffs who were prejudiced by the operation of a filling station and by
the haphazard handling of dangerous fuels).
45. Cf. Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884). In this case, action was
brought by neighbors to compel defendant to remove from his premises an
inflammable wooden structure used for the storage of large quantities of
pine and cypress lumber. The court found that the danger of fire was real.
Nevertheless, the court refused to issue a mandatory injunction for the
removal of the structure, because defendant's occupation was lawful and
the structure was not in itself the source of danger. The danger arose from
the manner in which defendant's business was conducted, and, accordingly,
the court issued a prohibitory injunction designed to correct the situation.
See also Fuselier v. Spaulding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847) (injunction prohibiting
the burning of a brick kiln on neighboring property).
46. See LA. Cxv. CoDE arts. 856-69.
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ana Code of Civil Procedure. For various reasons, these were
not the vehicles chosen by plaintiff for the relief he sought.
Article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure declares that "an
injunction shall issue where irreparable injury, loss, or damage
may otherwise result to the applicant." It would seem that,
even under this article, plaintiff could merely obtain, on proper
showing, an injunction for the suppression of the cause of danger, that is, an injunction designed to correct the improper use
of the tanks. Article 3663 affords injunctive relief "to a person
disturbed in the possession . . . of immovable property or of a

real right." The disturbance of possession contemplated by this
article may be either a disturbance in law or a disturbance in
fact. Clearly, there was no disturbance in law, and it is questionable whether there can be a disturbance in fact without
physical invasion of property.
In Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc.,47 an owner and
his lessee brought suit for injunction and damages against an
adjacent owner and his lessee. Plaintiffs complained that defendants' raised planter caused moisture to accumulate and deteriorate the base of a common wall and that a large vine caused
damage to plaintiffs' roof and walls. The disposition of the case
by the trial court gave rise to a number of important issues on
appeal, and Judge Lemmon undertook to discuss and resolve
these issues with admirable clarity and compelling logic.
The first question before the court was the propriety of an
injunction restraining defendant landowner from continuing to
maintain the raised planter in such a manner as to cause accumulation of moisture on the walls of the adjoining property and
from continuing to maintain the vine in such a manner as to
grow over the property onto plaintiffs' premises. The court
noted certain indications of "flux" in the jurisprudence of the
supreme court as to the basis of the suit, but declared emphatically that "the obligations of proprietors toward one another are
prescribed by C.C. art. 666-669.' ' 48 These articles establish the

principle that "otherwise lawful conditions may be abated, if
the conditions result in material injury to neighboring property
or interfere with the comfortable use and enjoyment of that
47. 255 So.2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 803.
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property by persons of ordinary sensibilities." 49 The court used
the word "nuisance" throughout the opinion as a descriptive
term that denotes violations of the obligations of vicinage rather
than in its technical common law sense.50 Of course, no one
may quarrel with this usage. On the basis of all available evidence, the court concluded that the raised planter and the vine
offended the principles of the Civil Code; hence, injunctions
were properly issued. Defendants' argument that irreparable
injury must be pleaded and proved to warrant injunctive relief
was dismissed with the declaration that "this is not necessary
in a suit to abate a nuisance." 5' 1
This requires comment. Cases may be found in which Louisiana courts have declared that injunctive relief is available
only if a nuisance causes "material, substantial, and irreparable
injury to a nearby property owner, for which there is no adequate remedy at law" 52 and that "where substantial redress can
be afforded by the payment of money and issuance of an injunction would subject the defendant to grossly disproportionate
hardship, equitable relief may be denied although the nuisance
is indisputable. '
It is submitted that these cases confuse the
requirements for injunctive relief in general with the requirements for injunctive relief under articles 667-69 of the Civil
Code. Under article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure, injunctive relief is indeed predicated on a showing of "irreparable injury, loss, or damage, '54 and equitable considerations of disproportionate hardship might be relevant under this provision.
Articles 667-69 of the Civil Code, however, afford injunctive
relief designed to secure the comfortable enjoyment of property
by persons of ordinary sensibilities. The obligations of vicinage'
are likened to servitudes, and, as servitudes, they are enforced
49. Id. at 804.
50. Id.: "Nuisance is a very comprehensive term which is not and should
not be the subject of technical definitions or rigid rules. The law in this
area should be expansive so as to provide for fair and reasonable results
under all the circumstances of each individual case."
51. Id. at 805.
52. Robertson v. Shipp, 50 So.2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
53. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 810, 155 So. 231, 28
(1934). See aLso Gibson v. City of Baton Rouge, 161 La. 637, 109 So. 389
(1926).
54. LA. CODS CIv. P. art. 3601.
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by injunctions upon a showing of interference with the lawful
enjoyment of property.55
The trial court had maintained defendants' exception of
improper cumulation of actions and had required plaintiffs to
elect between the abatement suit and the damage suit. Upon
plaintiffs' election to proceed in abatement, the trial court dismissed the damage suit without prejudice. On appeal, plaintiffs
assigned as error the maintaining of the exception of improper
cumulation of actions which resulted in the dismissal of their
damage suit. The court of appeal refused to pass on the merits
of plaintiffs' argument, because the judgment dismissing the
suit for damages was a final judgment that had not been appealed. An appeal from that judgment should have been successful. The trial court was clearly in error, because according
to a long line of Louisiana decisions actions for abatement and
for damages may be cumulated.56
Plaintiffs' suit against the defendant lessee was dismissed
by the trial court, apparently on the authority of Burke v. Besthoff Realty Co.57 which held that the word "proprietor" in article
667 does not include a lessee. On appeal, the court indicated its
reluctance to follow the restricted view expressed in the Burke
case, and declared its belief "that the liability of a party as proprietor under C.C. art 667 in a nuisance and damage case should
be determined on the basis of his responsibility for the existence
of the condition which constitutes the nuisance."58 The dismissal of the suit against the lessee was affirmed, however, because
the lessee had not actively participated or contributed to the
condition which caused plaintiffs' damages.
55. See Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 1110, 1127-28, 262 So.2d 339, 345 (1972):
"The relegation of a landowner to compensatory damages instead of to
injunctive relief for violation of his property right was permitted, so far
as we know, In only the two cited cases concerning very exceptional situa-

tions . . . and never so as to deny protection of a servitude due by a servient estate to a dominant estate."
56. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So.2d 230
(1949);

McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 206 La. 121, 19 So.2d 21 (1944); Di

Carlo v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933); Froelicher v.

Oswald

Ironworks, 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903);

Rayborn v.

Smiley, 253 So.2d 664 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
57. 196 So.2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). But see Scott v. LeCompte,
260 So.2d 345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La
App. 2d Cir. 1935); cf. Daigle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La.

1967); Arrington v. Hearin Tank Lines, 80 So.2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
58. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So.2d 800, 806 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1972). See also Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So.2d 127 (1971),
and text at note 42 supra.
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Conventional Servitudes
Conventional servitudes are those arising from destination
of the owner, acquisitive prescription, or juridical acts. 59 These
servitudes are ordinarily protected by real actions in accordance with the provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.6
1
In LouisianaIrrigation& Mill Co. v. Pousson,e
plaintiff filed
suit under article 3663 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to
enjoin defendant from interfering with the possession of a servitude for a lateral irrigation canal. This article requires that
plaintiff be in possession for more than a year prior to disturbance, and question arose whether plaintiff had met this requirement. The evidence showed that plaintiff possessed the canal
for many years prior to 1967. In that year, defendant used for
his own irrigation purposes the portion of plaintiff's canal that
was located on defendant's land. Defendant again used plaintiff's canal, during the irrigation season, in 1968. Plaintiff began
using his canal on defendant's property on May 12, 1969, and
continued doing so during the entire irrigation season. On
March 20, 1970, defendant cut the levee of plaintiff's canal and
began pumping water from his own well into plaintiff's canal.
On June 4, 1970, plaintiff filed suit to enjoin defendant from
using any portion of the canal, and the trial court granted a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for determination of defendant's claims for damages and attorney fees. In a scholarly opinion, Judge Culpepper declared that the real actions of the Code
of Civil Procedure afford remedies for the protection of possession as well as of the quasi-possession of incorporeals; that continuous and apparent predial servitudes are susceptible of quasipossession and, therefore, they are protected by the possessory
action and by injunction; and that since the canal in question
was an aqueduct, a continuous and apparent servitude, article
3663 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable. Plaintiff, however, was not entitled to injunctive relief under this

59. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 743, 765, 767-69, 3504; Yiannopoulos, Predial
Servitudes: GeneraZ Principzes; Louis4ana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L.
REv. 1, 43 (1968).
60. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3651-753;
PROPERTY §§ 120, 135-48 (1966).

61. 252 So.2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).

A.
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article because he failed to prove that he had possessed the
servitude for over a year prior to the disturbance of March 20,
1970. The court noted that defendant had possessed the servitude in 1967 and 1968 during the irrigation season only, namely,
from March through July, and that argument might be made
that plaintiff had not lost possession by usurpation that had
lasted for more than a year.0 2 The argument was answered by
the observation that possession during the irrigation season was
the only kind of possession of which the servitude was susceptible. 63 The Louisiana supreme court granted certiorari 64 and
65
affirmed.
Justice Dixon, writing for the majority, rendered an opinion that deserves attention for its clarity, logic, and methodology. The court agreed that article 3663(2) was applicable to
the case, and that defendant had in fact usurped plaintiff's possession under the terms of article 3449 of the Louisiana Civil
Code. Further, the court accepted the proposition that the canal
in question constituted a continuous and apparent servitude,
being the view most favorable to plaintiff. The court, however,
refrained from deciding by way of dicta a number of important
questions that were not propely before it, including the question
whether a rice irrigation lateral canal is an aqueduct or other
continuous apparent servitude, or even a predial servitude of
any kind. In an appendix, the court correctly indicated that the
determination of the nature of the right is not necessarily as
simple as maintained by plaintiff. The court noted, for example,
that plaintiff was not the owner of the estate benefited by the
canal servitude and carefully pointed out that the servitude might
well be discontinuous, in which case it might not be susceptible
of possession and protection by injunction under article 3663 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Justice Barham dissented, pointing out that there was no
evidence to indicate that defendant possessed the canal as owner,
and that there was sufficient evidence for the classification of
defendant as a precarious possessor. Further, he pointed out
that, in the light of local customs and the conditions of rice farming, irrigation canals are not constantly in use; plaintiff had
62.
63.
64.
65.

See
Id.
259
265

LA. Civ. CODM
art. 3449.
art. 3432(2).
La. 929, 253 So.2d 378 (1971).
So.2d 756 (La. 1972).
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been continuously in possession, having always used his canal
in accordance with the purpose for which it was established;
therefore, he was entitled to the relief he claimed.
The court correctly refrained from passing on the nature
of the right in question. This right could, indeed, be a personal
obligation, a veritable predial servitude, or a sui generis real
right in the nature of a limited personal servitude 6 If it were
a limited personal servitude, article 3663 (2) could be applicable
by analogy. It ought to be noted that defendant did not claim
that he was entitled to possession nor did he claim relief under
article 3663 (2), which would require a showing of possession
as owner for a period in excess of one year. The issue before
the court was whether plaintiff had been in possession for over
a year prior to March 20, 1970, and this issue was resolved
against plaintiff. The disposition of the case leaves room for
plaintiff to bring a petitory action.
In Armstrong v. Red River, Atchafalaya & Bayou Bouef
Levee Board,6 7 the court faced the question of the proper interpretation and application of article 798 of the Civil Code. In
the year 1949 plaintiff had granted defendant, by written instrument, a "servitude" for levee purposes. The instrument granted
defendant "the right to use all or any part of the above described property for any purpose with, or connected with construction or excavation of canals or ditches, storage or placement
of spoil or spoil dirt, storage or placement of any and all machinery and/or equipment, irrigation, storage or empounding
of water, levee construction or relocation and flood control or
anything incidental thereto." 68 The levee board promptly constructed a large drainage canal on a portion of the land burdened with the servitude. In 1969, plaintiff filed a suit to cancel
the servitude over the part of his land that had not been used
by the levee board, claiming that the servitude over that part
had been extinguished by non-use in accordance with article
798.
The court of appeal held that the servitude continues to
burden the entirety of plaintiff's land. In a scholarly opinion,
Judge Domengeaux, writing for the majority, undertook to ex66. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES §§ 123-25 (1968).

67. 261 So.2d 298 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
68. Id. at 299.
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plore the interrelations of articles 790, 791 and 798. The court
indicated that article 798, taken alone, lends support to plaintiff's argument of prescription. The court, however, declared
that this article "may not be read alone but instead must be
considered in conjunction with the other provisions of our law
touching on the topic." 69 Having determined that the servitude
in question was continuous and apparent, the court noted that
the time for the prescription of continuous and apparent servitudes begins to run according to article 790 "from the day any
act contrary to the servitude has been committed." 70 Since no
acts contrary to the servitude were alleged or proved, the court
concluded that prescription had not even begun to run. In a concurring opinion, Judge Culpepper correctly noted that article
798 contemplates prescription of the mode of exercise of a servitude rather than partial liberation of the area subject to the
servitude. The judge found equity in plaintiff's position, but
was unable to find any jurisprudential or statutory support for
the proposition that article 798 applies to an unused area as distinguished from mode of exercise. Judge Miller dissented on the
ground that "articles 797 and 798 both apply to the area upon
which a servitude may be exercised and that 798 provides a basis
upon which partial prescription of the area of servitude may
72
be rested."71 The Louisiana supreme court granted certiorari.
Since the requirements of prescription differ with the nature
of rights, the first question to be considered is the nature of the
right of use granted to the levee board. If the right were personal, prescription would begin to run either from the day it
ceased being exercised or from the day of its violation, namely,
from the day the levee board would have acquired a cause of
action for breach of contract.7" If the right were a veritable
predial servitude, prescription would be determined by direct
application of the provisions of the Civil Code governing extinction of predial servitudes by prescription. 74 And if the right
were a sui generis real right likened to a predial servitude, prescription would be determined by analogous application of the
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 300.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 790.
261 So.2d at 310.
263 So.2d 44 (La. 1972).
73. See LA. qiv. CODE arts. 3528, 3544.
74. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 783, 789-804.

1973]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1971-1972

193

provisions of the Code governing predial servitudes75 In Louisi-

ana, rights of use of property accorded to utilities, the state or
its political subdivisions, and to the general public are regarded
as "servitudes," governed by the provisions of the Civil Code,
although ordinarily there is no dominant estate in whose favor
the servitudes have been established. 0 Of course, according to
accurate analysis, real rights of use established in favor of persons rather than estates ought to be qualified as "limited personal servitudes.'" This qualification would lead to the same
practical results, namely, application by analogy of the rules of
the Code governing predial servitudes. There is thus ample authority for the classification of the right of use accorded to the
levee board as a servitude, and for application by analogy of
the provisions of the Civil Code dealing with termination of predial servitudes by the prescription of non-use.
Since the requirements of prescription differ with the kinds
of servitudes, the next question to be considered is whether the
servitude accorded to the levee board is continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent. According to the title, the
servitude was established for flood control, drainage, and irrigation by means of canals, levees, or ditches. The parties contemplated that the whole of the servient estate might be taken
for the realization of the purposes for which the servitude was
granted. It was of the essence of the servitude that constructions would be made and maintained on the servient estate. In
Louisiana and in France, servitudes are classified in the light of
their use rather than with reference to constructions which
make the use possible.7 8 The use of the servitude in question
was made by means of a large drainage canal located on a part
of the servient estate. The servitude was apparently exercised
without any act of man on the servient estate. Whether classified
as aqueduct or drain, or as any other species, the servitude in
question was continuous and apparent: it was manifested by
75. Cf. A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 102 n.188 (1966).
76. See, generally, LA. R.S. 19:2, 82, 389; 4d. 12:328; 4d. 38:2334; id.45:64;
id.48:833; Tennessee Gas Trans. Co. v. Bayles, 74 F. Supp. 258 (W.D. La.
1947); Tate v. Ville Platte, 44 So.2d 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950); Arkansas
La. Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So.2d 864 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
77. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVrrUDES § 125, at 408 (1968).
78. See 4 BEUDANT ET LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIgRE, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAxs 646 (2d ed. 1938); cf. Roy v. Roy, 5 La. Ann. 590 (1850); Hale v. Hulin,
130 So.2d 519 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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exterior works and was susceptible of exercise without any act
of man on the servient estate. 79
The court in the case under consideration was squarely
presented with the question whether the partial use of the area
subject to a continuous and apparent servitude preserves the
whole of the servitude or only the portion that has been actually
used. Article 798 of the Civil Code, taken literally and out of
context, seems to indicate that the servitude must be reduced
to the portion actually used. This article, however, must be
interpreted in combination with other articles and in light of
its historical derivation.
Article 798 was first adopted in 1825; it has no equivalent
in the French Civil Code. According to the redactors, the source
of the provision is: "Domat Part I, book 1, tit. 12, sec. 6, No. 5;
Toullier, Vol. 3, No. 700, p. 619."" The pertinent passage of
Domat reads as follows: "Servitudes are either lost by prescription or they are reduced to what has been preserved by possession during the time that suffices to establish prescription."81
Domat did not elaborate on this statement. Toullier, however,
wrote a whole chapter on the prescription of servitudes and
declared: "If I have enjoyed a right less extensive than is given
by the title, the servitude, whatever be its nature, is reduced to
that which is preserved by possession during the time necessary
to establish prescription." 82 This language was taken verbatim
in article 794 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, which became
article 798 of the Code of 1870.
The redactors of the 1825 Louisiana Code took the passage
of Toullier out of context. In context, it is abundantly clear that
Toullier speaks of the prescription of the mode of exercise of
discontinuous servitudes. He did not deal with the different
problem of the partial prescription of the area of the servitude
by the prescription of non-use. Further, Toullier makes it clear
that the prescription of the mode of exercise of the servitude
is pertinent only if the title of the servitude contains limitations
as to its mode of exercise. He says that
79. See Yiannopoulos, Predia Servitudes: General Principles; Louisiana
and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REv. 1, 34, 41 (1968).
80. 1 LOUISIANA LEOAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE or 1825, 91 (1937).
81. DOMAT, LEs Lois CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATURAL, 1 OEUVRES Do DOMAT

340 (Remy ed. 1828).
82. 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIViL FRANCAIs 206 (1833).
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"if the servitude is not limited by its title... it is presumed
to be unlimited; then, the use of the servitude made during
the night preserves the right to exercise it during the day,
because a single act of exercise of the servitude preserves
the whole of it, indefinite and unlimited, as it were: because,
according to Article 707 [of the French Civil Code which
corresponds with Article 790 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870] it is from the last day of enjoyment that the prescription begins to run." 8
Toullier is saying that the question of the prescription of the
mode of servitude arises only when there are limitations in the
title pertaining to the mode of exercise of the servitude. Article
798 of the Louisiana Civil Code then is applicable when the title
creating a discontinuous servitude establishes limitations as to
the mode of exercise, for example, by night, by day, by carriage,
or on foot. If there are no limitations, there is no question of
the prescription of the mode of exercise under article 798.
As to continuous servitudes, Toullier never thought that
partial use of the area of the servitude would result in partial
termination of the servitude. In section 709, Toullier declares:
"We must note that servitudes are not extinguished by prescription so long as there are vestiges of works established for their
use. These vestiges preserve the right, according to the maxim:
signum retinet signatum... . Thus, a window or an aqueduct
preserves the right of servitude although it is not used. ' '8 4 In
this respect Toullier follows the civilian tradition and applies
the principle of the indivisibility of predial servitudes.
Article 656 of the Civil Code establishes the principle that
servitudes are indivisible. By virtue of this principle, implicitly
adopted in France and in other civil law jursdictions, partial
use of a servitude suffices ordinarily to keep the servitude alive
as a whole. 5 But, by way of exception to the principle of indivisibility, articles 796-98 allow partial prescription of the mode
of exercise of discontinuous servitudes when there are limitations in the title of the servitude. This exception has its origin
in the texts of Domat and Toullier. The same exception is estab83. Id. at 208.
84. Id. at 209.
85. See BALlS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 335 (3d ed. 1955); GREEK CIV. CODE art.
1138.
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lished in article 708 of the French Civil Code which corresponds
with article 796 (1) of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
From the viewpoint of policy, argument might be made
that partial prescription ought to apply to the mode as well as
to the area of the servitude, whether the servitude is continuous
or discontinuous, and whether there are limitations in the title
or not. To accomplish these ends, article 798 could be applied
literally and out of context. The Louisiana supreme court, however, has apparently taken the view that the preferable policy
is to favor the preservation of the servitude as a whole, at least
when it is established in favor of public utilities or public
bodies. 86 In Hanks v. Gulf States Utilities Co.,87 the court followed a rather involved line of reasoning in order to give effect
to this policy, and the disposition of the case was fully supported by the provisions of the Civil Code.
Upon conclusion, it is submitted that articles 796-97 of the
Civil Code were intended to apply, and do apply, to discontinuous servitudes in cases in which the exercise of the servitude is subject to limitations contained in the title. These articles
have no application to continuous servitudes or to discontinuous
servitudes in the absence of limitations in the title. Louisiana
courts ought to apply these articles as exceptional provisions
that are not susceptible of extension by analogy: exceptio est
strictissimae interpretationis. Domat's rationalism ought to give
way to practicalities and to application of the principle of indivisibility of predial servitudes that has been expressly incorporated into the Louisiana Civil Code. The French sought to
restrict application of article 708 of their Code by resorting to
the obstacle theory. In Louisiana, application of articles 796-98
for the purposes for which they were intended is assured by
reliance on article 790. In this way, practical results will be
the same as in France and in other civil law jurisdictions. And
note, French courts sought to restrict the scope of partial nonuse even though the period of prescription is thirty years. In
Louisiana, where the period of non-use is ten short years, there
are additional reasons for a balanced interpretation of articles
86. See Hanks v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 253 La. 946, 221 So.2d 249
(1969).
87. 253 La. 946, 221 So.2d 249 (1969); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Property, 30 LA. L. Rzv. 181, 194 (1969).
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796-98. It is only such an interpretation that will do justice
to the scheme of the Code and to the text of Toullier, the actual
source of these provisions.
REAL AM PERSONAL RIGHTS; INJUNcTIVE RELIEF

The Civil Code has incorporated either expressly or by clear
implication a number of legal ideas, maxims, and classifications
that form the substratum of the civilian tradition. The classification of rights as "personal" or "real" is one of these basic
tenets of the Code, established in a number of scattered provisions.aS

According to traditional civilian doctrine, the contract of
predial lease gives rise to personal rights only. 89 This is also
the view established by well-settled jurisprudence of the Louisiana supreme court.2 Having merely a personal right, the
predial lessee possesses the property for his lessor rather than
for himself; 91 and he does not even enjoy a quasi-possession of
the lease, because it is only real rights that are susceptible of
quasi-possession.9 2 Thus, according to fundamental principles
of the Civil Code and of the Code of Civil Procedure, the predial lessee has no standing to bring the possessory action in his
own name against persons encroaching on the leased property.9 3
Nevertheless, since the lessee has a valuable patrimonial right,
he may bring all sorts of personal actions against the lessor or
third persons, including actions for damages under article 2315
of the Civil Code and for injunctive relief under the conditions
of article 3601 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
In Indian Bayou Hunting Club, Inc. v. Taylor,94 the predial
88. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 490, 492, 2012, 3282.
89. See POTHIER, TRAIT DU CONTRAT DR LOUAOu, 4 OEUVRES DE POTHIER 2
(1861); 9 DEMOLOMBm, TRAIT DR LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 395 (1876); A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 95 (1966).
90. See Leonard v. Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964); Harwood
Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So.2d 764 (1960); Reagan v.
Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958); Wolfe v. North Shreveport Devel.
Co., 228 So.2d 148 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969). Exceptionally, in expropriation
proceedings,

predial leases

function

as real

rights.

See Columbia Gulf

Trans. Co. v. Hoyt, 252 La. 921, 215 So.2d 114 (1968).
91. See LA. CoDE CIv. P. art. 3656: "A predial lessee possesses for and
in the name of his lessor, and not for himself." See also LA. CIv. CODE art.
3441 (1870).
92. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432(2) (1870); 3 PLAINOL ET RIPERT, TRAITh PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 53 (2d ed. Picard 1952).

93. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3655, 3656.
94. 261 So.2d 669 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
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lessee of a large tract of land brought action to enjoin the defendants from trespassing on a portion of the leased property.
The trial court granted plaintiff's demand, and the Court of
Appeal for the Third Circuit affirmed on the ground that article
3663 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure affords injunctive
relief to a predial lessee. The court declared that all this article
requires is "corporeal possession" and that the possession of the
lessee meets this requirement. To bolster its conclusion, the
court relied on an interpretation of the historical sources of
article 3663, namely, provisions of the Code of Practice and pertinent jurisprudence. In an eloquent concurring opinion, Judge
Domengeaux pointed out that the result could be justified only
by application of article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
proceeded to a critique of the reasoning of the majority opinion.
There is no reason to repeat here the compelling arguments
made in the concurring opinion. It suffices to state that the majority opinion tends to blur the distinction between personal
and real rights and implicitly conflicts with the jurisprudence
that declares predial leases to be personal rights. Further, the
majority opinion leads to an undesirable result as it emasculates the provisions of article 3656 of the Code of Civil procedure. Whereas the predial lessee is expressly denied possessory
protection by article 3656, the same lessee may accomplish the
purposes of the possessory action by the simple expedient of a
demand for an injunction under article 3663. 95 Finally, the majority opinion contradicts settled rules of statutory interpretation as it takes article 3663 out of its context and disregards
article 3660. This last article declares: "A person is in possession
of immovable property or of a real right, within the intendment
of the articles of this Chapter, when he has the corporeal possession thereof, . . . and possesses for himself ....
-96 Article
3663 is located within the chapter devoted to real actions and
must be applied in combination with article 3660. Accordingly,
a predial lessee is not "a person who is disturbed in the possession .

.

. of immovable property or of a real right" under article

3663,11 because he has neither possession nor a real right in
immovable property.
95. In many instances real rights may be completely protected by injunctive relief alone. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CiviL LAW PROPERTY § 141 (1966).
96. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3660. (Emphasis added.)
97. For a correct application of article 3663, see Davis v. Caluda, 260
So.2d 772 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).

